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BRISA’S TAKEOVER OFFER 
 
This project is composed by a Case Study regarding Tagus’ takeover offer for Brisa. The case study describes 
each player involved in the operation: the target company – Brisa, the acquirers – José de Mello and Arcus; 
as well as the circumstances surrounding the takeover, with a description of the takeover itself and the conflict 
between the acquirers and Abertis. 
Associated to the case, there is a group of six question and their respective answers, regarding the motive of 
the takeover, the price per share, what should be the positions of Brisa’s shareholders regarding the takeover 
and the reason Brisa’s share price declined after the success of the operation. 
 















BRISA’S TAKEOVER OFFER  
On March 29th 2012, Tagus Holdings launched a 680 million euros takeover offer for Brisa – Auto-Estradas 
de Portugal, the largest road concessionaire in Portugal and one of the largest in Europe.  
Tagus Holdings is jointly owned by the two largest shareholders of Brisa, the Portuguese family group – José 
de Mello and the British infrastructure fund – Arcus; which wanted to obtain the complete control of the 
target company. However, in the middle of their plan stood Brisa’s third largest shareholder - Abertis, the 
Spanish infrastructure concessionaire and a long-time nemesis of José de Mello and Arcus. 
 The big question around this takeover was where this was the final battle for Brisa’s control or was just one 
more episode in the struggle between Abertis and the coalition composed by José de Mello and Arcus. 
 
THE TARGET – BRISA 
 
Brisa – Auto-Estradas de Portugal was created in 1972 as a private concessionaire for the construction, 
conservation and exploration of the country’s highway network (A1 – Lisbon/Oporto, A2 – Lisbon/Setúbal, 
A3 – Oporto/Famalicão and A5 – Lisbon/Cascais), with a total of 382 km, 59 of which already built and that 
would be included once the adjacent sections where finished (Exhibit 1). However, soon after the company 
foundation the military coup of 1974 occurred, which despite barely affecting the company operations, 
affected its shareholder composition.  Due to the nationalization in 1975 of the Portuguese financial sector, 
27.5% of Brisa’s capital was now indirectly owned by the Government. Moreover, in the following years the 
Government entered directly in Brisa’s capital through capital raises, therefore obtaining the control of the 
majority of the capital and consequently of the company. 
After 1986, the Portuguese government decided to expand the national highway network using the funds the 
country started to receive from the European Economic Community. As a consequence, Brisa won new 




The 1990’s were an extremely successful decade for Brisa. In 1991 Brisa achieved its first major milestone 
by completing the highway between Lisbon and Oporto – A1, ending the construction almost 20 years after 
the initial concession contract was signed. In 1995 Brisa launched a new electronic toll payment system 
called “Via Verde”. This new service allowed its subscribers to be directly charged in their bank accounts 
for the toll fare, which allowed a faster and more comfortable journey. Via Verde won in 1994 (during the 
test phase) the Tool Innovation Award from the International Bridge Tunnel and Turnpike Association as a 
recognition of the quality and innovation of the service. 
In 1997 the Portuguese Government decided to re-privatize Brisa by selling its position in the company 
through an IPO. The Government directly owned 89.7% of the company’s capital and owned more 10% 
indirectly through stated owned enterprises. Brisa’s IPO was on November 25th and the government sold 
35% of the company capital at a price of €2.42 per share. The remaining stated owned shares were sold in 
three different occasions until June 2001. (Exhibit 2 and 3).  
In the new millennium Brisa continued its expansion, however the main focus was in the international 
markets. In Portugal, Brisa achieved an integrated highway network of 1000 km, after the opening of the last 
sections of A2 (Lisbon – Albufeira). As a result, Brisa´s highways connected Portugal from North to South 
and East to West. Additionally, Brisa expanded its national activities through subsidiary companies – Brisal, 
through participated companies – Douro Litoral, Baixo Tejo and Litoral Centro and through the acquisition 
of other concessionaries such as Auto-Estradas do Atlântico, whose 50% of the capital was bought by Brisa. 
Simultaneously, Via Verde continued its implementation in Portugal, achieving 2 million clients in 2006, the 
same year it was granted another award, the IBTTA Toll Excellence Award. By the end of 2011 Via Verde 
achieved a total of 3 million clients in Portugal. 
In 2001 Brisa expanded its activities abroad with the acquisition 20% of CCR’s (Companhia de Concessões 
Rodoviárias), which was the largest road concessionaire in Brazil. In 2007, Brisa acquired 90% of the capital 
of Northwest Parkway in the United States and later in 2010 it entered the growing Indian market through a 
joint venture with the local Feedback Ventures establishing the Feedback Brisa Highways, and sold its CCR 
participation. At the same time, due to Via Verde’s success and the accumulated knowledge, Brisa entered 
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in some consortiums to operate payment systems in tolls, parking lots and other facilities, such as the KTS 
from Czech Republic in 2006 and the Movenience from Holland in 2010. 
Between 2010 and 2011 Brisa restructured its Portuguese operations, creating Brisa Concessão Rodoviária 
(BCR), to control the concessions that were directly under Brisa Auto-Estradas, as well as all the associated 
assets and liabilities. Therefore, Brisa Auto-Estradas became a holding company (Exhibit 4). This 
reorganisation was made with the purpose of increasing the financial and investment capacity of Brisa. With 
the transferal of the liabilities associated with the highway concessions to BCR, the main company has seen 
its rating increased and consequently its cost of debt decreased. In the end of 2011, Brisa controlled several 
different companies divided into three sectors: highway concessions, operation and maintenance services 
and other business (Exhibit 4 and 5), accounting for a total of 6483 million euros in assets (Exhibit 6). 
The vast majority of Brisa’s highways are under the standard concession model in Portugal, which determines 
that the toll price or the car fare is negotiated between the government and the concessionaire, with the 
concessionaire bearing the associated traffic risk. Therefore, Brisa’s overall risk is directly connected to 
traffic fluctuations in Portugal, as its concessions represented 87% of its 2011 EBITDA (Exhibit 7).  
Brisa’s concession include the most important highways in the country, with A1, A2 and A3 connecting the 
most important coastal cities in Portugal from North to South, with A5 and A9 – CREL, serving the 
metropolitan area of Lisbon and A4 the metropolitan area of Oporto. Due to their important location, these 
six concessions have stable traffic volumes through the years, and they are also the most used highways in 
the country. Together they represented 82% of Brisa’s total traffic volume, in 2011 (Exhibit 7), reducing the 
overall risk level of the company. 
From 2004 to 2009 Brisa’s revenues from tolls and other operations increased from 573 million euros to 677 
million euros (Exhibit 8), as a consequence of the expansion of its operations. However, in the same period, 
Brisa’s EBIT decreased from 315 million euros to 223 million euros, which is the result of higher 
amortization expenses and of a decline in the company’s efficiency, as its EBITDA only increased 41 million 
euros to 461 million euros.  
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In the end of 2010, Portugal was affected by the Sovereign Debt Crisis, which originated a recession in the 
following year and consequently reduced Brisa’s toll revenues by 15 million euros to 631 million euros. 
In that same year, Brisa’s EBITDA was equal to 461 million euros and EBIT was equal to 267 million euros 
(Exhibit 8) although, its Net Income was equal to -82 million euros as a consequence of losses in 
investments.  
From 2012 to 2016 Brisa’s EBIT was expected to increase up to 262 million euros (Exhibit 9), as a result of 
an increase in the revenues and of an improvement in the operating margin. Consequently, the Net Income 
was expected to increase to 173 million euros, fostered by the reoccurrence of financial gains in investments. 
Although, in 2012 Brisa’s revenues were expected to decrease by 2.16% as a consequence of the austerity 
measures taken under the Economic Adjustment Programme and the associated economic depression. In the 
following years, Brisa’s revenue were expected to recover. 
 
THE ACQUIRERS 
JOSÉ DE MELLO GROUP 
 
José de Mello Group (José de Mello) was founded in 1986 by José Manuel de Mello with the purpose to 
recover part of the family companies that were nationalized in the aftermath of the military coup of 1974. 
The Mello’s family business activities started in the 1890’s when Alfredo da Silva a shareholder of the 
bankrupt bank – Banco Lusitano, managed to acquire most of the bank’s debt and subsequently save it. At 
the same time, he also saved two of the bank’s borrowers – Companhia Aliança Fabril and Companhia União 
Fabril merging them in Companhia União Fabril – CUF. 
The CUF project was the most ambitious and successful industrial project in Portugal. This success resulted 
from Alfredo da Silva’s capacity to benefit from the opportunities provided by a rural and agricultural country 
to an industrial conglomerate. Therefore, CUF grew throughout the years and constantly expanded itself into 
new business activities.   
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In 1942, the Mello family inherited Alfredo da Silva’s empire, as a result of the marriage of his daughter – 
Amélia de Oliveira da Silva with D. Manuel José de Mello, son of the Earl of Cartaxo.  
Despite the constant search of new profitable business, the Mello family also supported the social 
development of society and consequently CUF created several canteens, kindergartens, libraries, hospitals, 
schools, among other social equipment’s. Therefore, CUF and the Mello family where ahead of their time 
for Portugal, as they already practice what today we call corporate social responsibility. 
CUF achieved its peak during the 1970’s, as it was the largest conglomerate in the Portuguese industry with 
its activities spread between more than 100 companies with 110 thousand employees operating in several 
different business sectors, such as textile, mining, food, health, dockyard, and the financial sector, among 
others. As a result, by 1974 CUF represented 5% of the Portuguese GDP and was the frontline of the 
country’s industrial development, with activities spread throughout the Portuguese oversees colonies, such 
as Angola, Mozambique and Guinea-Bissau.  
In that same year, Portugal suffered a military coup to install a democracy, which leaded the country into a 
turbulent period with the communist and the democratic forces trying to establish their own type of regime. 
As a consequence, the financial sector and the largest and vital companies in Portugal were nationalized in 
1975 and their owners were arrested and later sent to exile.  Due to its importance CUF was one of the main 
targets and after the nationalization it was dismantled. 
In the second half on the 1980’s Portugal had a stable new democratic regime and consequently it was able 
to join the European Economic Community, which leaded to the privatization of the nationalized companies. 
The Mello family returned to Portugal, with the two male grandsons of Alfredo da Silva creating two different 
groups. One of them, José Manuel de Mello, established its holding company – José de Mello - with the 
purpose of recovering the family legacy. Soon after the return, the group acquired Uniteca, re-entering in the 
chemical industry, one of the main business sectors where CUF was present. In 1988, the José de Mello 
Group obtained a trading license which originated the stock brokerage “M Valores”. In that same year, it 
also acquired the first privatized financial institution – Sociedade Financeira Portuguesa, later converted into 
a bank named Banco Mello. With the succession of re-privatizations, José de Mello acquired one of CUF’s 
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main assets, the insurance company “Companhia de Seguros Império” and consequently its hospital - 
Hospital CUF. 
By the end of the 1990’s, José Manuel de Mello was following the steps of its grandfather as he was present 
in the industrial and financial sector at the same time, benefiting from the accumulated knowledge of the 
family. In 1997 the group re-established the brand CUF in the chemical sector. Two years later, in 1999, the 
group’s financial sector (Banco Mello e Companhia de Seguros Império) were merged into the BCP group. 
Consequently, José de Mello became an important shareholder of the largest private financial group in 
Portugal.  
In the beginning of the new millennium, the group focused its activities on the most profitable and attractive 
business, re-adjusting its operations and portfolio. The two main examples of this strategy were the increase 
in Brisa’s capital up to 30% and the joint takeover offer with the Têxtil Manuel Gonçalves for Efacec, the 
largest manufacturer of high voltage components in Portugal, which gave José de Mello 50% of its capital. 
Moreover, the group expanded some of its business such as its health care division by opening new hospitals 
and CUF’s chemical operations, both under the brand CUF. 
By the end of 2011, the José de Mello Group had a total of 3483 million euros in assets (Exhibit 10). The 
group was constituted by 4 fully owned companies: José de Mello Residências e Serviços (elderly care and 
services); José de Mello Saúde (hospitals and other health care facilities); José de Mello Imobiliária (real 
estate) and CUF (chemical and industrial business). Furthermore the group had 50% of Efacec’s capital and 
30% of Brisa, as well as other minority positions in other companies. In that same year, the group revenues 
were worth 1078 million euros, which leaded to an operating income of 12 million euros. Due to financial 








ARCUS INFRASTRUCTURE PARTNERS 
 
Arcus Infrastructure Partners is a British fund manager specialized in infrastructure investment throughout 
Europe. Arcus was created in 2009, in the aftermath of a management buyout of part of the European 
operations of the bankrupt Babcock & Brown. 
Arcus team members, which had been considered among the best European infrastructure managers since 
the mid 1990’s, have accumulated experience in several different infrastructure segments such as seaports, 
rails, roads, airports, utilities and telecommunications. This experience and knowledge allows Arcus to 
actively manage its assets and consequently provide attractive risk adjusted returns to its investors.  
By the end of 2011 Arcus only fund – Arcus European Infrastructure Fund - had more than 2 billion euros 
under its managements. Besides Arcus position in Brisa, it also had relevant positions in companies such as 
Alpha Train (Luxembourg based freight and passenger train operator), Angles Train (British freight and 
passenger train operator), Forth Porto (British seaport operator), Europort (European seaport operator), Shere 
Group (British based telecommunication tower operator) and TDF (French broadcasting infrastructure 
operator). 
 
THE SPANISH THREAT 
 
Abertis, the Spanish highway concessionaire conglomerate and one of the largest infrastructure 
concessionaire in the world (Exhibit 15), entered in Brisa’s capital in 2002 with the intention of defining the 
business of the later. However, throughout the years Abertis was frequently in disagreement with José the 
Mello over Brisa’s strategy, investments and dividends, which leaded to several struggles within Brisa’s 
shareholder structure. 
In the beginning of 2012, after Abertis had increased its position by 0.4% to 16.31% of the voting rights 
(Exhibit 12), rumours that Abertis would launch a takeover offer for Brisa started. This possible takeover 
attempt represented a serious threat to José de Mello’s control over Brisa, as it did not own the majority of 
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the voting rights of the latter. Moreover, José de Mello was highly indebted and needed Brisa’s dividends to 
meet its debt obligations. Therefore, José de Mello needed to neutralize Abertis’ takeover threat to protect 
its shareholder position and the continuity of the dividends. 
 
THE TAKOVER OFFER 
 
To maintain the control over Brisa and to guarantee the continuity of the dividends, José de Mello needed to 
neutralize Abertis’ takeover threat. For that purpose the ownership of the majority of Brisa’s voting rights 
was necessary, which was only possible to achieve through a takeover offer. 
Moreover, José de Mello was being pressured by the largest Portuguese banks (Caixa Geral de Depósitos, 
Banco Espírito Santo and Millennium BCP) to launch a takeover offer for Brisa and to take it private. José 
de Mello had given its Brisa shares as collateral for loans, to these banks. However, the price of the shares 
declined since 2008 (Exhibit 3) and by the end of 2011 the value of the shares was not enough to serve as a 
guarantee to the loans. Consequently, José de Mello would have to increase the collaterals or the banks would 
have to raise more capital, two solutions not feasible in the middle of the crisis Portugal was facing. If Brisa 
was taken private the value of the collateral would be determined by the financial institutions and would not 
depend on the stock market, solving José de Mello’s and the bank’s problem. 
Therefore, if José the Mello launched a takeover offer for the totality of Brisa’s capital it would be able to 
solve its two problems at once, as well as guarantee the necessary capital, as the financial institutions 
pressuring the operation would finance the acquisition. Furthermore, José de Mello was able to obtain the 
support of Arcus, which was also dependent on Brisa’s dividends and wanted to preserve its influence in the 
company’s management. 
For the purpose of launching the takeover offer for Brisa – Auto-Estradas de Portugal, José de Mello and 
Arcus created Tagus Holdings (55% and 45% of the capital, respectively), a vehicle through which its two 
shareholders would acquire Brisa’s outstanding shares.  
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The objective of the takeover was to take Brisa private implying that Tagus, José de Mello and Arcus needed 
to control, together, at least 90% of the voting rights. Therefore, the offer targeted 46.20% of Brisa’s 
outstanding shares, which corresponded to more than 255 million shares (Exhibit 12). The acquirer offered 
2.66€ in cash for each of those stocks, implying a premium of 13.38% over the closing price of the takeover 
announcement day (Exhibit 13) and of 4.72% over the analysts median target share price (Exhibit 14). The 
680 million euros needed to acquire the 255 million shares, would be provided by a syndicate of banks 
composed by Millennium Investment Bank, BESI - Espírito Santo Investment Bank and CaixaBI - Banco de 
Investimento.  
According to Tagus, Brisa’s activities would not be affected by the takeover. However, the acquirer 
announced that wanted to increase Brisa’s efficiency by promoting a better coordination among Brisa’s 
different operations, with the purpose of giving shareholders a higher cash flow value. Therefore, Tagus also 
announced that they would reduce the investment expenses to the minimum required by the concession 
contracts. 
This takeover offer happened after the Portuguese Debt Crisis and during the subsequent Economic 
Adjustment Programme, which started in April of 2011. These two events deeply affected the market 
perception about Portugal, which at that point was seen as more risky. Hence, investors demanded a higher 
return to the Portuguese companies when compared to their European counterparts. 
 
WOULD ABERTIS COUNTER ATTACK? 
 
Tagus’ takeover offer for Brisa was José de Mello’s response to Abertis’ threat. With this takeover José de 
Mello anticipated itself to the Spanish concessionaire and made the first move, which allowed it to secure 
Arcus’ support. 
In the end of March of 2012, Abertis controlled 16.31% of Brisa’s voting rights (Exhibit 12), which put the 
future of Tagus’ takeover in its hands. If Abertis decided to sell its shares, Tagus would not face any serious 
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threat to its plans. On the other hand, if Abertis decided to not sell, the takeover attempt would fail as Tagus 
would not be able to obtain the 90% of Brisa’s voting rights it needed.  
As a consequence, every player in the market was questioning if Abertis would counter attack by not selling 
its position in Brisa, to later launch its own takeover offer and try to destroy the collation between José de 
Mello and Arcus. 
 
THE AFTERMATH  
 
Tagus’ announcement of its takeover offer for Brisa was followed in the next weeks by severe critics. In the 
first place, financial analyst considered that the price offered by Tagus was considerably low and that it did 
not reflect the real situation of Brisa.  Abertis and some small shareholders accused Brisa’s board, which was 
chaired by a member of the Mello family – Vasco de Mello – and controlled by José de Mello and Arcus, of 
not defending the interest of all the shareholders and that its neutrality was an undercover support for the 
takeover. Moreover, Abertis announced that it would not sell its shares under the current price and asked the 
Portuguese financial market regulator – CMVM - to appoint an independent analyst to establish the share 
price of the offer. 
Due to this situation and to avoid the failure of the takeover, Tagus decided in July to increase the price of 
the offer to 2.76€ per share, implying a premium of 8.66% over the analysts median target share price. With, 
this new offer most of the critics disappeared and the vast majority of Brisa’s shareholder sold their positions 
in the takeover, including Abertis.  
Tagus, José de Mello and Arcus owned after the takeover 84.8% of Brisa’s shares and controlled 92% of the 
voting rights, which allowed them to take Brisa private as intended. However, the situation was not as simple 
as it appeared. In one hand José de Mello and Arcus could take Brisa private as they had the necessary voting 
right to do so. Although, on the other hand they were not able to force the remaining shareholders to sell their 
position in a squeeze out operation, as they did not own 90% of the shares. Moreover, they did not show any 
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intention of launching another takeover offer for the remaining outstanding shares, which worried the 
remaining shareholders as their shares would lose their liquidity. 
Therefore, it took five months (from September to February) for the financial market regulator – CMVM – 
to answer Tagus request. The CMVM ruled that Tagus would only be allowed to take Brisa private if it 
accepted to acquire, by a fair price, the shares of any shareholder that wanted to sell his position. As a result, 
in 5th of April of 2013, after CMVM approval, Tagus announced that Brisa would be taken private on 11th of 
April and that until 13th of May it would pay 2.22€ per share to any shareholder which desired to sell it 
position. All the remaining shareholders accepted the offer, thus José de Mello, Arcus and Tagus now control 




1. What were the reasons that leaded José de Mello and Arcus to launch this takeover?  
2. What is the reasoning behind the price per share offered by Tagus? 
3. Imagine you are an independent analyst. What recommendation would you give to Brisa’s 
shareholders? Explain your decision. 
4. Consider the different positions that Abertis could take regarding the takeover offer. Explain which 
position you consider the best one. 
5. In June Tagus increased its offer to 2.76 euros per share. Does the increase in the price affect you 
answer to question 3 and 4?  
6. What were the reasons that leaded to the fall in Brisa’s share price after the success of takeover, as 



























Exhibit 2 - Brisa re-privatization process
Year Capital Sold Price
nov/97 35% 2.42 €
nov/98 31% 4.16 €
mai/99 20% 4.35 €
jul/01 4.76% 4.95 €
Source: Brisa, Diário da Républica & Jornal de Negócios






Source: Brisa, Portugal Convida & IMTT

















Concessionaire of Brisa's main concessions which 
includes A1 (Oporto-Lisbon), A2 (Lisbon - Albufeira), 
A3 (Oporto-Valença), A4 (Oporto-Amarante), A9 
(CREL), A10 (Bucelas-Benavente), A12 (Setúbal-
Montijo), A13 (Almeirim-Marateca) and A14 
(Coimbra-Figueira da Foz). Its concession if valid up to 
2035.
1 124 503 75% 100%
Auto-estradas 
do Atlântico
Concessionaire of up to 2028 of two highways A8 
(Caldas da Rainha - Leiria) and A15 (Caldas da Rainha 
- Santarém) .
170 63 69% 50%
Brisal Concessionaire of A17 (Marinha Grande - Mira). 93 19 36% 70%
Douro Litoral
Concessionaire of A32 (Oliveria de Azeméis - Vila 
Nova de Gaia), A41 (Ermida - Espinho) and A43 
(Gondomar - Aguiar de Sousa) until 2034.
126 5 -41% 45%
Baixo Tejo
Concessionaire of A33 (Funchalinho - Penalva), A38 
(Almada - Costa da Caparica), IC3 (Montijo - 
Alcochete), IC31 (Barreiro) until 2038.
68 - - 30%
Litoral Oeste
Concessionaire of A19 (São Jorge - Leiria), IC9 
(Nazaré- Tomar), IC36 (A8 Leiria - A1 Leiria), 
Circular Oriental de Leiria (COL),  Via de Penetração 
de Leiria (VPL) and other minor roads up to 2039.
112 - - 15%
Northwest 
Parkway
Concessionaire of part of Denver's ring road 
(Broomfield) until 2106.
14 8 52% 100%
Feedback Brisa 
Highways
Concessionaire of highways in India. Operates under 
the brand Ezeeway. 
5 800 - - 40%
Via Verde
Controls and manages the Electronic Toll Payment 
System with the same name as the company. In addition 
for the toll payment, this system also allows the payment 
of parking lots and other facilities uses by vehicles.
- 36 23% 60%
Brisa Operação 
e Manutenção
Provides integrated operational and maintenance 
services to transport infrastructures as well as support 
to the user of those infrastructures.




Provides engineering and project management services. - 17 -11% 100%
Mcall Brisa's call-center. 3 15% 100%
Brisa Inovação 
e Tecnologia
Investigates, creates, produces, and operates  intelligent 
services used in the operation of transport 
infrastructures.




Provides consulting services to highway and roads 
concessionaires.
- - - 50%
Movenience
Collects the toll payment on Westerschelde tunnel in the 
Holland. In addition for the toll payment, it started to 
expand the payment system to parking lots and other 
facilities uses by vehicles, following Via Verde example.
- - - 40%
Elos - Ligações 
Alta Velocidade
Concessionaire of the infrastructures of the high speed 
train in the section Caia-Poceirão. The concession is 
expected to start in 2014 and last for 35 year.
- - - 16%
Controlauto Vehicles inspection company. - 28 34% 60%
TIIC
Investment Fund for transport infrastructures. Jointly 
detained by Brisa, Millennium Investment Bank and La 
Compagnie Bejamin de Rothschild.
- - 35%





Exhibit 5  - Brisa's Main Subsidiaries and Participated Companies
Highway Concessions
Operation and Maintenance Services













Cash & Equivalents 44 266 312 151 204 733 113 119 140 261 170 496 1 355 939 969 197
Accounts Receivable 131 117 126 275 123 324 147 964 48 375 52 344 64 745 64 038
Inventory 4 773 5 256 5 574 6 055 5 646 4 034 4 964 7 928
Other Current Assets 37 131 35 720 31 575 7 250 58 375 20 754 27 437 30 206
Total Current Assets 217 287 479 402 365 206 274 388 252 657 247 628 1 453 085 1 071 369
Non-Current Assets
Property, Plant and Equipment 2 493 849 2 724 122 3 102 579 3 621 676 3 693 628 3 565 386 93 617 86 231
Goodwill 8 666 31 630 31 630 29 436 29 436 28 130 28 130 28 130
Intangible Assets 359 965 371 728 379 966 866 692 1 220 925 946 894 4 248 794 5 013 289
Investments in Associate Companies 119 217 181 115 255 522 195 404 163 502 297 158 26 646 28 965
Other Financial Investments 71 164 18 260 3 013 2 039 14 230 24 378 10 361 9 484
Financial Assets Detained for Sale 519 559 311 997 135 205 139 063 4 332 - - -
Deferred Income Taxes 305 770 187 530 131 834 194 411 183 790 138 428 178 433 192 731
Other Non-Current Assets 5 086 6 127 34 113 35 938 31 308 29 239 32 355 39 209
Other Non-Current Assets Detained for Sale - - - - - 5 14 170 13 843
Total Non-Current Assets 3 883 276 3 832 509 4 073 862 5 084 659 5 341 151 5 029 618 4 632 506 5 411 882
Total Assets 4 100 563 4 311 911 4 439 068 5 359 047 5 593 808 5 277 246 6 085 591 6 483 251
Liabilities
Current Liabilities
Accounts Payable 21 094 18 586 20 515 20 922 18 859 17 969 26 744 18 537
Loans 204 514 842 528 346 618 261 634 474 539 528 286 399 010 676 920
Payables from Non-Current Assets 106 868 100 083 69 275 68 368 24 300 27 443 26 375 19 292
Other Current Liabilities 53 654 62 178 59 801 127 655 110 112 90 154 128 814 71 702
Total Current Liabilities 386 130 1 023 375 496 209 478 579 627 810 663 852 580 943 786 451
Non-Current Liabilities
Loans 2 071 684 1 538 574 2 222 379 3 059 102 3 339 580 2 986 397 3 155 744 3 809 524
Provisions 8 050 6 314 4 258 4 437 5 223 56 507 320 841 203 140
Liabilities by Deferred Taxes 1 407 1 687 1 753 1 385 8 379 14 807 25 704 33 091
Other Non-Current Liabilities 98 024 116 711 148 490 124 208 240 117 121 325 109 183 328 400
Total Non-Current Assets 2 179 165 1 663 286 2 376 880 3 189 132 3 593 299 3 179 036 3 611 472 4 374 155
Total Liabilities 2 565 295 2 686 661 2 873 089 3 667 711 4 221 109 3 842 888 4 192 415 5 160 606
Equity
Common Stock 600 000 600 000 600 000 600 000 600 000 600 000 600 000 600 000
Company Detained Stocks -16 752 -27 090 -89 969 -108 920 -176 113 -176 113 -176 113 -275 422
Accumulated Gains (+)/ Losses (-) from Associated Companies 607 -1 152 349 335 335 -29 710 -44 764 -4 293
Reserves 304 107 287 556 451 662 464 379 382 572 413 337 410 947 456 529
Accumulated Gains (+)/ Losses (-) from Forex Operations -5 538 -5 854 -21 317 -11 949 -46 868 3 289 3 111 12 520
Retained Earnings 454 051 461 645 431 736 423 319 429 725 431 675 321 590 787 988
Net Income 191 121 297 814 167 047 259 357 151 832 161 021 778 500 -82 157
Shareholder's Equity 1 527 596 1 612 919 1 539 508 1 626 521 1 341 483 1 403 499 1 893 271 1 495 165
Non-Controlling Interest 7 672 12 331 26 471 64 815 31 216 30 859 -95 -172 520
Total Equity 1 535 268 1 625 250 1 565 979 1 691 336 1 372 699 1 434 358 1 893 176 1 322 645
Total Equity and Liabilities 4 100 563 4 311 911 4 439 068 5 359 047 5 593 808 5 277 246 6 085 591 6 483 251
Source: Brisa
Exhibit 6  - Brisa's Consolidated Balance Sheet

















Services 559 083 560 180 559 573 622 638 632 645 644 801 646 531 631 275
Other Operational Income 13 817 17 080 26 351 23 416 53 198 32 089 27 171 38 903
Reversion of Amortizations and Depreciation 1 509 107 - 417 203 126 12 266 55 008
Revenue associated with Construction Services - - - - - - 78 837 62 136
Total Operational Revenues 574 409 577 367 585 924 646 471 686 046 677 016 764 805 787 322
Operational Costs
COGS -2 618 -3 744 -3 381 -4 307 -6 330 -2 667 -5 792 -15 401
Variation of Production 644 359 462 -205 -217 253 467 -
Outsourced Services -65 825 -72 274 -76 193 -89 745 -98 676 -91 481 -88 544 -88 985
Salaries -75 621 -80 537 -85 351 -86 466 -93 328 -95 128 -100 943 -101 174
Amortization and Depreciations -105 674 -115 504 -123 835 -177 910 -205 099 -237 724 -294 107 -193 900
Provisions and Imparity Losses -3 708 -7 234 -84 -193 -1 120 -21 124 -139 851 -52 782
Other Operational Costs -7 040 -2 905 -3 631 -6 233 -4 701 -6 253 -5 111 -5 504
Costs associated with Construction Services - - - - - - -78 837 -62 136
Total Operational Cost -259 842 -281 839 -292 013 -365 059 -409 471 -454 124 -712 718 -519 882
EBIT 314 567 295 528 293 911 281 412 276 575 222 892 52 087 267 440
EBIT Margin 54.8% 51.2% 50.2% 43.5% 40.3% 32.9% 6.8% 34.0%
Financial Expenses -109 666 -91 779 -87 593 -123 371 -196 177 -157 124 -155 086 -160 342
Financial Income 35 159 9 286 17 308 20 543 19 693 9 854 9 162 53 130
Gains (+)/ Losses (-) from Investments 40 159 206 954 10 489 44 420 83 858 106 952 857 500 -217 746
EBT 280 219 419 989 234 115 223 004 183 949 182 574 763 663 -57 518
Income Tax -87 976 -121 074 -65 818 31 727 -47 532 -42 600 -22 744 -20 652
Net Income 192 243 298 915 168 297 254 731 136 417 139 974 740 919 -78 170
Attributable to:
Minority Interest 1 122 1 101 1 250 -4 626 -15 415 -21 047 -37 581 3 987
Brisa's Shareholders 191 121 297 814 167 047 259 357 151 832 161 021 778 500 -82 157
Source: Brisa
Exhibit 8 - Brisa's Consolidated Income Statement





Operational Revenues 655 715 658 546 668 020 679 553 693 240
Operational Costs -255 729 -253 540 -253 848 -254 832 -256 499
EBITDA 399 986 405 006 414 172 424 720 436 741
EBITDA Margin 61.0% 61.5% 62.0% 62.5% 63.0%
Amortization and Depreciations -190 000 -190 000 -185 000 -180 000 -175 000
EBIT 209 986 215 006 229 172 244 720 261 741
EBIT Margin 32.0% 32.6% 34.3% 36.0% 37.8%
Net Financial Income (+)/ Expenses (-) -120 498 -128 817 -127 904 -129 356 -130 663
Gains (+)/ Losses (-) from Investments -20 000 50 000 70 000 80 000 100 000
EBT 69 488 136 188 171 268 195 364 231 079
Income Tax -17 372 -34 047 -42 817 -48 841 -57 770
Net Income 52 116 102 141 128 451 146 523 173 309
Attributable to:
Minority Interest 5 000 5 000 5 000 5 000 5 000
Brisa's Shareholders 47 116 97 141 123 451 141 523 168 309
Capex 75 905 64 519 58 067 52 261 53 306
Source: One of the purpose of the elaboration of this case, was that it could be analysed by future students. Therefore, 
for pedagogical reasons the date presented was adapted and changed from Brisa projections.
Exhibit 9 - Brisa's Consolidated Income Statement Forecast












Cash & Equivalents 91 98 194 180 174 171
Inventory 120 126 96 75 90 100
Financial Investments 1 730 2 270 1 852 1 952 1 907 1 878
Property, Plant and Equipment 236 269 276 354 386 392
Goodwill 106 115 116 115 114 113
Other Assets 480 978 1 150 1 045 1 209 1 188
Total Assets 2 764 3 856 3 683 3 720 3 880 3 843
Liabilities
Loans 1 935 2 522 2 714 2 780 2 860 2 868
Provisions and Benefits of Employees 61 77 95 81 76 76
Other Liabilities 461 480 592 512 533 672
Total Liabilities 2 457 3 079 3 400 3 373 3 469 3 617
Equity
Common Stock 170 170 170 170 170 170
Share Issue Premium 5 5 0 0 0 0
Retained Earnings 51 130 171 181 6 139
Net Income 35 435 -82 -31 192 -125
Shareholder's Equity 261 739 259 320 368 184
Non-Controlling Interest 45 37 24 27 43 41
Total Equity 307 776 283 347 411 226
Total Equity and Liabilities 2 764 3 856 3 683 3 720 3 880 3 843
Source: José de Mello
Exhibit 10 - José the Mello's Group Consolidated Balance Sheet












Share of the 
Capital
Share of the 
Voting Rights
Total number of Shares 600 000 000 - -
Brisa 47 236 842 7.87% -
José de Mello 182 843 792 30.47% 33.08%
ARCUS 114 557 795 19.09% 20.72%
Target Shares 255 361 571 42.56% 46.20%
of which belong to Abertis 90 143 700 15.02% 16.31%
Exhibit 12 - Brisa's Shareholders at 29/03/2012
Source: CMVM
In million €
Revenues 910 1 173 1 078
Operating Costs -893 -1 143 -1 066
Operating Income 16 30 12
Financial Income (+)/Loss (-) -40 168 -134
Income Taxes -3 -7 0
Minority Interest -4 1 -1
Net Income 35 435 -82 -31 192 -125
Source: José de Mello
Exhibit 11 - José the Mello's Group Consolidated Income Statement











Date Recommendation Price Premium over Takeover Price
Takeover Price per Share 29/03/2012 - 2.66 € -
Goldman Sachs 28/03/2012 Neutral 2.20 € 20.91%
Alpha Value 22/03/2012 Sell 2.54 € 4.72%
Exane BNP Paribas 15/03/2012 Underperform 2.10 € 26.67%
BBVA 13/03/2012 Underperform 2.40 € 10.83%
BPI 13/03/2012 Buy 3.40 € -21.76%
Espiríto Santo Investment Bank 08/03/2012 Buy 3.30 € -19.39%
Oddo& Cie 08/03/2012 Sell 2.20 € 20.91%
CaixaBI 07/03/2012 Buy 3.80 € -30.00%
Millennium Investment Bank 20/02/2012 Buy 3.15 € -15.56%
Natixis 07/02/2012 Sell 2.20 € 20.91%
Nomura 26/01/2012 Sell 2.88 € -7.64%
JP Morgan 12/01/2012 Underperform 2.40 € 10.83%





Exhibit 14 - Analysts Target Share Price for Brisa at 29/03/2012






Takeover Price per Share 2.66 € -
Closing Price on Announcement Date 2.35 € 13.38%
Average Price weighted by trading volume in the Three Months before 
the Announcement
2.44 € 8.80%
Average Price weighted by trading volume in the Six Months before the 
Announcement
2.45 € 8.64%
Exhibit 13 - Brisa's Takeover Price Premium





Exhibit 15 - Comparable and Other Financial Information
Abertis SIAS Atlantia
Market Multiples
Equity Value/EBITDA 2011 4.04 x 2.13 x 3.29 x
β Levered 0.94 0.77 0.83
Debt (million euros) 17 792 19 277 2 945
Market Capitalization (million euros) 9 904 1 306 7 849
β  Levered of Brisa 0.73
Corporate Tax Rate 25%
German Bond 1Y 0.70%
German Bond 2Y 0.92%
German Bond 5Y 1.63%
German Bond 10Y 2.50%
German Bond 30Y 3.10%
Source: Takeover Prospectus, Bloomberg, Atlantia, SIAS, Abertis
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CASE DISCUSSION  
 
1. What were the reasons that leaded José de Mello and Arcus to launch this takeover?  
 
José de Mello and Arcus launched this takeover offer for Brisa in order to frustrate any attempt of Abertis 
launching its own takeover. José de Mello, Brisa’s largest shareholder, needed the dividends paid by the 
target to fulfil its high debt obligations, thus, it could not risk to lose Brisa’s control. The only solution, was 
for José the Mello to launch a takeover for the majority of Brisa´s voting rights.  
Moreover, the three largest Portuguese banks (Caixa Geral de Depósitos, Banco Espírito Santo and 
Millennium BCP) were pressuring José de Mello to take Brisa private, in order to solve its problem of 
insufficient collaterals in its loans. José de Mello had given its Brisa shares as a collateral to these banks, 
however due the fall in target’s share price, its value become too low. Therefore, José de Mello would have 
to increase the collaterals or the financial institutions would have to raise more capital. Two solutions that 
were extremely difficult to fulfil due to the crisis Portugal was facing. If Brisa was taken private each 
financial institution would be able to issue its own valuation of the collateral, solving the problem. As a 
result, with this takeover José de Mello was able to solve these two problems at once. Arcus, who was jointly 
controlling Brisa with José de Mello, joined the takeover in order to maintain its influence in the target 
company. 
Additionally, this operation allowed the two acquirers to obtain the totality of the targets cash flows to 
themselves, which bare low risk due to Brisa’s stable traffic volumes in its most important highway 
concessions (A1, A2, A3, A4, A5 and A9). José de Mello is a family owned private conglomerate whose 
purpose is to build a portfolio that provides to the family a good income over the current and the next 
generations. Arcus is an infrastructure investment fund who needs to provide to its investor a good risk 
adjusted return through cash payments. Therefore, the additional cash flows would allow these companies to 
offer higher return to their investor. In José de Mello’s case they would also help the group to reduce its high 
indebtedness level.  
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2. What is the reasoning behind the price per share offered by Tagus? 
 
The price per share offered, by the acquirer, in a takeover attempt can usually be divided between the fair 
price and the premium. The premium is the amount paid above the fair price in order to convince the target’s 
shareholders to sell their positions. 
In order to discover the reasoning behind the price of the takeover offer, it is possible to use the APV 
(Adjusted Present Value) or the market multiples of comparables firms or the analyst target price for Brisa 
as well as its historical market price.  
The APV valuation of Brisa, using its own β (0.21), gave us an equity value of 1404 million euros 
(Discussion Note 1 & Appendix 2), which corresponds to a share price of 2.54€. When compared to the 
price offer in the takeover it has an implied premium of 4.73% (Appendix 1). If we use the β Brisa’s 
comparables (0.37), the APV valuation gives an equity value of 778 million euros (Discussion Note 1 & 
Appendix 3), which corresponds to a share price of 1.41€. In this scenario the implied premium is equal to 
88.92%. The difference between these two values is almost certainly explained due to the higher correlation 
verified between the market and Brisa’s comparables. 
The valuation of Brisa’s equity using its comparables multiples gives us the equity value based on the 
company’s EBITDA, which in 2011 was equal to 461 million euros. The total equity value is equal to 1455 
million euros (Appendix 4), which corresponds to a price per share of 2.63€. Thus the takeover offers a 
premium of 1.07%. 
Based on all the information obtained (Appendix 1) it is possible to conclude that Brisa’s fair price per share 







3.  Imagine you are an independent analyst. What recommendation would you give to Brisa’s 
shareholders? Explain your decision. 
 
Tagus was offering a lower price for Brisa, in its takeover attempt, than the one expected in similar situations. 
Usually the premium paid by the acquirers is around 10% and could go up to 20%/25% when the control of 
the company is at stake. However, Tagus was only paying a premium between 1% and 4% when compared 
to the valuation obtained from the multiples, APV and market analyst. Even when compared to the average 
market price in the months prior to the takeover announcement (2.44€/2.45€), the premium offered in the 
takeover was inferior to 9%. Therefore, I believe that Tagus was not paying enough for Brisa. 
Although the price offered by Tagus was low, I would still advise Brisa’s shareholders to sell their shares. If 
José de Mello and Arcus manage to obtain 90% of the voting rights and subsequently take Brisa private, any 
shareholder that did not sell its position, would now own shares that had less liquidity and consequently bear 
a lower value.  
Concluding, I believe that the risk small shareholders face if they do not sell is too high, when compared to 
the additional return they might have. However, as Abertis has the future of the takeover in its hands, small 
shareholders could wait for the decision of the Spanish concessionaire before selling their shares. 
 
4. Consider the different positions that Abertis could take regarding the takeover offer. Explain 
which position you consider the best one. 
 
One of the reasons behind Tagus takeover operation was the attempt to frustrate the possibly of Abertis 
launching its own takeover. Thus, the failure of this takeover would leave Brisa exposed to the Spanish threat. 
Furthermore, Abertis owned 16.31% of Brisa’s voting rights, which put the success of Tagus’ offer in hand 
of the Spanish concessionaire. Therefore, Abertis would only be willing to sell its shares if and only if the 
premium paid was good enough to compensate for the forgone opportunities. However, the premium offered 
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by Tagus does not even reach 9% based on the vast majority of the valuations, which is below the average 
premium paid in a regular takeovers. As a result, I believe that Abertis should not sell its shares. 
 
5. In June Tagus increased its offer to 2.76 euros per share. Does the increase in the price affect you 
answer to question 3 and 4?  
 
The increase in the price per share, offered by Tagus, from 2.66€ to 2.76€ increased the premium from a 
range between -1.68% and 8.8% to the range between 2.02% and 12.89% (Appendix 5). The new price bare 
a premium between 4.8% and 8.67% when compared with the APV, market analyst and multiples valuation 
and between 12.7% and 12.9% when compared with the average market price in the months before the 
takeover. 
In question number 3, I have recommend Brisa’s shareholder to sell their shares, thus with this higher price 
it is only logical to maintain the same recommendation.  
Regarding Abertis, considering that the Spanish concessionaire has the future of the offer in its hands and 
that it would benefit from the failure of the takeover, the premium paid by Tagus continues to be considerable 
low. Even though the premium is closer to the regular values offered in takeovers, it is still not enough to 
compensate Abertis for its forgone plans. Therefore, I would maintain the answer to question 4, where I have 
said that I believed that Abertis should not sell its shares. 
 
6. What were the reasons that leaded to the fall in Brisa’s share price after the success of takeover, 
as shown in Exhibit 3? 
 
Brisa lost around 25% of the company’s market capitalization after the announcement of success of the 
takeover offer, launched by Tagus. Financial evidence shows that a fall of this magnitude is the result of a 
change in the perception that investors have over a company. In this case, the success of the takeover implied 
that Tagus would soon request the withdrawal of Brisa from the stock market. As a result, minoritary 
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shareholders would soon own a less liquid asset as it would be far more difficult to sell it. Consequently, 
Brisa’ shares had a lower value than the one they would have if the company remained public.  
To conclude, Brisa’s share price dropped as investors were expecting the company’s withdraw from the stock 
market, and applied a discount around 20% when compared to the valuation given by the APV, multiples 


























DISCUSSION NOTE 1 – APV ASSUMPTIONS 
 
In order to calculate the APV valuation of Brisa it was necessary to make some assumption. 
The first assumption was that the operating cash flows of Brisa were equal to 170 million euros, which was 
used to calculate the NWC (Net Working Capital) requirement. The excess cash was subtracted to Brisa’s 
debt to obtain its Net Debt. 
The second assumption was that the NWV requirements were equal to 15% of the operational revenues 
(Appendix 6), which was the average of the NWC requirement between 2006 and 2011. 
The third assumption was that in the Terminal Value Brisa all the components of the free cash flows were 
going to growth at a rate of 1.5% per year for 20 years, as BCR’s concession only lasts until 2035. 
Furthermore it was assumed that EBIT’s and EBITDA’s margin are going to remain constant in the Terminal 
Value.  
Finally, to calculate the cost of capital (Appendix 7), first it was necessary to estimate the value of the 
unlevered β’s. To achieve them the value of the levered β’s, given by the case, was divided 
by (1 + (1 − 𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒) ∗
𝐷
𝐸
). The Debt-to-Equity ratio was estimated using the market value of equity and 
the book values of net debt. The value of the β from Brisa’s comparables is equal to the average of the 
unlevered β of the three companies. The cost of capital was calculated through the CAPM formula, using as 
risk free rate the yield of 10 years German Government Bond and as market risk premium for Portugal a rate 













Appendix 1 - Brisa's Fair Share Price and Associated Premium with price of March 2012
Price Premium
Takeover Price per Share - 29/03/2012 2.66 €
Market Prices
Average Price in the Three Months before the Announcement 2.44 € 8.80%
Average Price in the Six Months before the Announcement 2.45 € 8.64%
Market Multiples
Average 2.63 € 1.07%
APV (β Brisa) 2.54 € 4.73%
APV (β Comparables) 1.41 € 88.92%
Analyst Target Price
Average 2.71 € -1.68%














Appendix 2 - APV Valuation using Brisa's β
In 000 € 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 TV (2016)
Operational Revenues 655 715 658 546 668 020 679 553 693 240 10 656 555
Operational Costs -255 729 -253 540 -253 848 -254 832 -256 499
EBITDA 399 986 405 006 414 172 424 720 436 741 6 713 630
Amortization and Depreciations -190 000 -190 000 -185 000 -180 000 -175 000 -2 557 573
EBIT 209 986 215 006 229 172 244 720 261 741 4 156 057
Operating Taxes -52 497 -53 751 -57 293 -61 180 -65 435 -1 039 014
NOPLAT 157 490 161 254 171 879 183 540 196 306 3 117 042
Amortization and Depreciations 190 000 190 000 185 000 180 000 175 000 2 557 573
NWC Requirement 14 463 -2 830 -9 474 -11 533 -13 687 -210 401
Capex -75 905 -64 519 -58 067 -52 261 -53 306 -819 422
Total Free Cash Flow to the Firm 286 047 283 905 289 338 299 747 304 313 4 644 793
Discounted FCF 286 047 272 911 267 364 266 257 259 846 3 966 087
Interest Paid -120 498 -128 817 -127 904 -129 356 -130 663 -2 008 559
Interest Tax Shield -30 125 -32 204 -31 976 -32 339 32 666 502 140
Discounted Interest Tax Shields -30 125 -30 957 -29 548 -28 726 27 892 428 766
Discount Factor 1.00 0.96 0.92 0.89 0.85 0.85
Unlevered Value of Brisa 5 318 513
PV of Interest Tax Shield 337 303
Value of Net Debt 4 251 878
Equity Value of Brisa 1 403 939
# Shares 552 763 158
Price per Share 2.54 €















Appendix 3 - APV Valuation using Brisa's Comparables β
In 000 € 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 TV (2016)
Operational Revenues 655 715 658 546 668 020 679 553 693 240 9 613 743
Operational Costs -255 729 -253 540 -253 848 -254 832 -256 499
EBITDA 399 986 405 006 414 172 424 720 436 741 6 056 658
Amortization and Depreciations -190 000 -190 000 -185 000 -180 000 -175 000 -2 307 298
EBIT 209 986 215 006 229 172 244 720 261 741 3 749 360
Operating Taxes -52 497 -53 751 -57 293 -61 180 -65 435 -937 340
NOPLAT 157 490 161 254 171 879 183 540 196 306 2 812 020
Amortization and Depreciations 190 000 190 000 185 000 180 000 175 000 2 307 298
NWC Requirement 14 463 -2 830 -9 474 -11 533 -13 687 -189 812
Capex -75 905 -64 519 -58 067 -52 261 -53 306 -739 237
Total Free Cash Flow to the Firm 286 047 283 905 289 338 299 747 304 313 4 190 270
Discounted FCF 286 047 269 971 261 635 257 745 248 829 3 426 277
Interest Paid -120 498 -128 817 -127 904 -129 356 -130 663 -1 812 008
Interest Tax Shield -30 125 -32 204 -31 976 -32 339 32 666 453 002
Discounted Interest Tax Shields -30 125 -30 624 -28 915 -27 808 26 710 370 408
Discount Factor 1.00 0.95 0.90 0.86 0.82 0.82
Unlevered Value of Brisa 4 750 504
PV of Interest Tax Shield 279 648
Value of Net Debt 4 251 878
Equity Value of Brisa 778 274
# Shares 552 763 158
Price per Share 1.41 €

























Appendix 4 - Brisa's Valuation using Comparables Multiples
Abertis SIAS Atlantia Average
Market Multiples
Equity Value/EBITDA 2011 4.04 2.13 3.29 3.15
Brisa EBITDA (in 000 €) 461 340 461 340 461 340 461 340
Equity Value (in 000 €) 1 863 814 982 654 1 517 809 1 454 759
# Shares 552 763 158 552 763 158 552 763 158 552 763 158
Price per Share 3.37 € 1.78 € 2.75 € 2.63 €
Appendix 5 - Brisa's Valuation using Comparables Multiples with price of June 2012
Price Premium
Takeover Price per Share - June 2012 2.76 €
Market Prices
Average Price in the Three Months before the Announcement 2.44 € 12.89%
Average Price in the Six Months before the Announcement 2.45 € 12.72%
Market Multiples
Average 2.63 € 4.87%
APV (β Brisa) 2.54 € 8.67%
APV (β Comparables) 1.41 € 96.03%
Analyst Target Price
Average 2.71 € 2.02%




















Abertis SIAS Atlantia Brisa (Comp. Ave) Brisa
0.94 0.77 0.83 0.73
17 792 19 277 2 945 4 252
9 904 1 306 7 849 1 299
# Shares 552 763 158
Price per Share 2.35
179.64% 1476.03% 37.52% 327.32%
0.40 0.06 0.65 0.37 0.21
Cost of Capital 5.38% 2.96% 7.15% 5.16% 4.03%
Rf Rate 2.50%
Mark. Risk Prm Port. 7.20%
Corporate Tax Rate 25.00%
Appendix 7 - Cost of Capital
Unlevered β
Levered β
Net Debt (in million euros)
Equity (in million euros)
D/E
Appendix 6 - NWC Requirement
In 000 €
Operational Revenues 670 178 655 715 658 546 668 020 679 553 693 240
NWC 100 527 98 357 98 782 100 203 101 933 103 986
NWC Requirement 14 463 -2 830 -9 474 -11 533 -13 687
20162011 2012 2013 2014 2015
